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ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM AS CHINA’S PRIMARY EXTERNAL MODEL OF 
LEGALITY:  WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR CHINA’S FUTURE? 
 
by David Baharvar
1
 
 
 With the rapid industrialization and globalization of the People’s Republic of China (the 
“PRC” or “China”) now taking place, Chinese law and society are changing quickly.  Today we 
witness much dialogue, both within China and in the rest of the world, about China’s looking to 
other countries for answers to the problems it faces.  Chinese leaders look to industrialized 
countries with longstanding legal institutions, many in the West, for legal models in reforming or 
modernizing their own judicial system.  Part of looking to the West seems to be a consequent 
shift toward adversarial legalism.  Young, bright Chinese lawyers who are the future reformers 
of the Chinese system currently flock to western countries, especially to the United States, to 
study the adversarial legalism that is so central to western systems and to bring back their best 
points to China.
2
  To date, many of the laws of the United States have evidently been accepted in 
China as the best example to follow.
3
 
The significance of China’s looking to adversarial legalism as its primary external model 
of legality is that a legal system developed in one context would be imposed on a different 
society, potentially with harmful results.  On one hand, Chinese philosophies of law have deep 
roots going back thousands of years, including various schools of thought, some of which have 
parallels with Western legal philosophies.  On the other hand, today’s China is a very young and 
new country whose political developments have varied enormously from Western industrialized 
nations and whose legal and political workings are based on fundamentally different principles 
regarding the role of law in society.  Even if done slowly over time, the implications of more 
adversarial legal practice in China could mean a great deal of confusion and, in fundamental 
respects, inappropriate dispute systems design: cutting back on mediation that is traditionally 
prevalent in China; insufficient protections of judicial review; a lack of individual rights to 
balance out collective interests, and others.  As for the international significance of Western-style 
legal reforms, looking to adversarial legalism has implications for how China is viewed by the 
rest of the world: in the World Trade Organization and in the United Nations as well as by the 
United States, by multi-national corporations and by other influential actors on the world stage.  
 Perhaps most importantly, however, China’s looking to western societies such as the 
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United States has implications for the Chinese people’s identity and self-perception: what China 
has been, how it relates to the rest of the world, and what it will be in terms of a legal culture 
with its own unique norms and practices, based in but not beholden to the past.  Therefore, part 
of this inquiry into the implications of adversarial legalist reform for Chinese social values, 
concepts of justice and legal practice will involve considering the key philosophies and theories 
that have shaped a Chinese social consciousness over the course of history.  The choice to 
examine ancient Chinese social theories in this article is based on the legal historicist proposition 
that historical study matters in order to understand the implications of present-day law and policy 
choices.  Such an approach has its roots in such influential legal thinkers as Savigny, who posited 
that the authentic law of every nation is the law that has evolved from the nation’s aboriginal 
“folk spirit” (Volksgeist) or common consciousness of the people, and therefore, historical study 
is required in order to recover and understand the authentic law.  While in the case of Savigny, 
the starting point was Roman law principles in order to understand the common law of Europe 
and the Ur law of Germany in the nineteenth century,
4
 in the case of Chinese legal reform, the 
starting point should be the social theories underlying Confucianism and Daoism, among other 
philosophies.  
However, before examining the implications of a move toward adversarial legalism for 
Chinese legal thought and practice, it is crucial to define what is meant by adversarial legalism in 
the context of western and, especially, the American legal system.  A recent treatment of this 
subject and discussion of the phrase itself is provided by Robert E. Kagan in Adversarial 
Legalism: The American Way of Law.
5
  Kagan places adversarial legalism at the nexus of 
American law, policy and social relations in general.  He describes it as “policy making, policy 
implementation, and dispute resolution by means of lawyer-dominated litigation.” Works such as 
Kagan’s emphasize that the central goal of adversarial legalism is not to bring about harmony, 
peace, or the resolution of disputes per se.  Rather, the theme is of a constant struggle of 
competing entitlements: who is right and who is wrong and who’s rights and behavioral norms 
will be treated as more important than others’ rights and behavioral norms.   
The struggle at the center of adversarial legalism that Kagan presents is premised on the 
belief that if all sides to a dispute are represented by competent counsel, the judge before whom 
the dispute is pending will be presented with briefings of law from counsel upon which the court 
will arrive at a just result.  In other words, the judges rely on the ardent advocacy of the attorneys 
on all sides in any given case to present the law as it is or -- if change is in the wind -- as the law 
should be.  The basic idea is that by weighing the opposing arguments, the judge can render a 
correct decision on the application of the law to the facts of the case before the court.  This 
struggle, then, is at the core of legal systems such as that of the United States.   
The challenges and consequences of applying such an adversarial legalist paradigm to 
Chinese society are manifold.  If we start by examining a Chinese collective consciousness 
which is the product of millennia of history and cultures in that part of the globe, it is clear that, 
on fundamental levels, adversarial legalism is at odds with basic aspects of several core thought 
systems at play.  Confucianism and Daoism are perhaps foremost factors in this collective 
consciousness.  These systems affected the development of legal codification in China in 
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profound and basic ways.
6
  Confucianism is a 2400-year old philosophy of social order with a 
hierarchical structure, pointing to the Emperor as the supreme authority.  The supreme authority 
must be obeyed.  High priority is given to proper action and respect according to family roles in 
any given situation.  Daoism is a 2600-year old philosophy based on the teachings of Lao Tzu 
and focuses on simplicity, honesty in life and noninterference with the course of natural events.  
The impact of these systems over millennia has survived into the judicial system of the modern 
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) despite the official abrogation of the older regime.
7
  One 
reason these thought systems have survived is that legal codes, even centuries-old, and civil 
servants, even ones trained only in the classical texts, were needed to quickly fill the gaps in the 
early PRC’s institutions.  In fact, these philosophies along with later ones that both resisted and 
incorporated aspects of them, have not only survived but are pervasive in Chinese law and social 
norms today.
8
  These paradigms, then, coupled with the divergent path of China’s government 
over the last century as compared to most western industrialized nations, make for conditions 
that possibly militate against adversarial legalism as one solution to China’s current challenges.  
Consequently, any adversarial legalist reformers must carefully consider the influence of these 
systems and the likely responses to such reforms that these systems will engender in Chinese 
society. 
To illustrate, the pervasiveness of legal struggle in American society may conflict 
strikingly with Lao Tzu’s views of harmony and “the way.”
9
  Lao Tzu’s paradigm is one in 
which institutions of law and the existence of crime are seen as interconnected: that is, they are 
seen as mutually reinforcing phenomena.
10
  For those who have adopted this aspect of Lao Tzu’s 
philosophy in the course of Chinese history, the conclusion that follows is that law itself should 
be minimized as an institution in society.  Such an attitude may be contrasted with the picture 
that Kagan paints, of a relatively activist role of modern American government demanded by 
American citizens (even while always tempered by conservative voices).  Such a role for 
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government and rule of law is far beyond the “purposive inaction” (Wu Wei) envisioned for a 
ruler by Lao Tzu, which carries through to certain aspects of a Chinese social mentality today. 
But even while Lao Tzu’s Daoism had great historical impact on Chinese thought, it 
never rose to great prominence in terms of application to structuring Chinese governance.  
Perhaps, then, a more apt and immediately relevant connection between twenty-first century 
China and ancient thought systems would be provided by Confucianism, which became officially 
endorsed during the Han dynasty and afterward.  However, in Confucian philosophy, despite all 
its stark differences with Daoism, there seems to be little that would welcome adversarial 
legalism either.  While adversarial legalism celebrates law as a primary and regular form of 
expression of civil society, the Confucian tradition sees litigation as a last resort.  While in 
adversarial legalism lawyers are the most dynamic actors in the courtroom, who bring to the fore 
the key issues of concern to the society as a whole, it was not so long ago that many Chinese 
courts did not even allow lawyers in the courtroom. 
The essential gap between these legal traditions seems to be that whereas the adversarial 
legalistic worldview tends to focus on individual rights and welfare, the Confucian tradition 
tends to focus on the welfare of the collective or the community.  Put another way, while the 
adversarial legalist tradition in the West strives to view all individuals equally (“justice is blind”) 
without regard to their social status, position or connections, the Confucian tradition in Chinese 
law judges individuals in terms of their “proper” roles, determined by their network of 
relationships within society.   
What is the significance of the difference between these legal traditions?  One 
manifestation of the difference in practice would be that, while western adversarial legalism is 
rooted in ideas of individual accountability to the state (e.g., Lockean and Kantian ethical and 
political notions), such ideas would clash with the Chinese legal tradition’s recurring notion of 
collective punishment, as seen for example in the codification of laws or in the 1780 case of In 
Re Hsu Chung-Wei.
11
  Another manifestation of the gap in legal thinking is that, whereas the 
adversarial legalism of the United States stems from a culture of distrusting any concentration of 
power in the state and its agencies, Confucianism fosters a paternalistic view of the state (as well 
as the family and society in general) in which the state is in charge of making decisions for the 
people, who are likened to children.  An illustration of this difference is provided by the one-
child policy of China, a policy at least partially based in Confucian ideas of hierarchy.  If 
American-style legal reforms were to be implemented in
 
twenty-first century China, it is difficult 
to conceive of how such a policy of one child per nuclear family could escape severe scrutiny or 
not be overturned in a short period of time based on arguments for individual rights in civil 
society (even if the only sanctions for disobeying the policy are economic). 
All of these differences imply disconnects with the adversarial legalist model and, in 
particular, the American model.  These disconnects may manifest themselves as Chinese lawyers 
try to apply American legal thinking to their society.  For example, we see already how 
Confucian currents clash with adversarial legalistic ones in regard to the enforcement of illegal 
contracts.  Recently, contract cases in Chinese courts have shown (so far) a flexible but overall 
relatively stable consensus that a party may not refuse to perform a contract just because it was 
                                                 
11
 In Re Hsu Chung-wei, Bo’an Xinbian [New Collection of Reversed Cases] (1780) (trans. By Harvard East Asian 
Legal Studies Group) 254-83.  This is an opinion from an appellate judge panel in regard to a homicide case, in the 
year 1780.  Significantly, instead of choosing to punish the father who had covered up the murder of his son, the 
court, instead, chose to punish the younger son, who had reported the case.  The reasoning is based on family 
obligations and gratitude that a son owes a father.  
 
 69 
illegal, whereas such a holding would plainly run counter to the American common law of 
contracts.
12
  Arguably, the reasoning behind the Chinese position is connected to the Confucian 
notion that there are cases where rites (li),
13
 a kind of ancient social norm in China, should take 
priority over law.  How this deep-rooted tradition would interact with western or, specifically, 
American notions of rule of law as implemented in China is hard to predict since similar notions 
are not completely alien to American common law.  But it is not hard to imagine the resulting 
discord given the stark differences in reasoning between these two legal traditions.  While 
arguably any legal system needs to allow clashes to happen in order to move forward, the degree 
of the clash may be too large in this case for a revised Chinese legal system to work. 
On the other hand, there is some evidence to argue the opposite: that Confucian 
paternalism is quite compatible with the high expectations of the public in adversarial legal 
systems such as the modern United States that the government must “take care” of its citizens.
14
  
Besides this, in looking at Confucian influence over the course of the Chinese legal tradition, one 
should also look at subsequent disciples and other influential thinkers who took Confucius’ ideas 
in other directions.  Mencius, for example, saw the same sort of obligation on the part of the state 
to provide the conditions under which people may flourish
15
 that Americans seem to demand of 
the state under adversarial legalism: “protection from serious harm, injustice, and environmental 
disasters”, as Kagan puts it.
16
  In a way, Mencius restated and amplified the Confucian idea that 
with power comes responsibility.  However, going beyond Confucius, Mencius also added a 
suggestion that a government which does not fulfill its responsibilities can and should be 
challenged as illegitimate.  These ideas, in parallel, are powerful currents in the stream of 
American political thought going back at least to the Declaration of Independence.   
One might add that, besides Confucianism, there are currents in Chinese thought that may 
be more welcoming of, and compatible with, a legalistic society (even if not an adversarial one).  
Perhaps the clearest example would be the Legalists, who saw law as a central institution of 
society rather than a last resort.
17
  But while the Legalist tradition provides some evidence of 
support for something akin to adversarial legalism in Chinese thought, a basic distinction must 
be made: the Legalist tradition in Chinese thought is most supportive of a rule by law, not a rule 
of law.  The Legalists saw law as strictly top-down and imposed by a static state apparatus, rather 
than a constant development driven by the people (bottom-up).  Further, the Legalist current in 
Chinese thought is averse to uncertainty or unpredictability on the part of the powers that be or 
ambiguity about what are the “rules.”  This aversion to dissent conflicts with the American 
common law system of fragmented courts, such as the federal circuit courts, in which the 
constant production of discrepancy and dispute in the application of statutes is the very engine of 
progress and ultimate determination of settled (though never completely binding) precedents 
regarding recurring legal dilemmas.  While there is much regional variation in contemporary 
Chinese jurisprudence, one must keep in mind that it was largely for the purpose of assuring 
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some basic uniformity in law that Chinese governments, upon examining western legal systems 
of prior decades and centuries, chose to adopt civil codes (as in continental Europe) rather than a 
common law system, and to adopt judge civil servant career tracks and exams rather than 
judgeship by political appointment.  The stability of civil code systems is arguably greater as 
compared to the ambiguity, competition, complexity, and relatively less hierarchy as seen in an 
adversarial legal system.
18
  On balance, then, one would think that the Confucian and Daoist 
views would be the most prominent ideological obstacles to western-style adversarial legalist 
reforms in China. 
Such a disconnect may well limit the effectiveness of any adversarial legalistic reform as 
friction may develop between Confucian and Daoist currents and adversarial legalist reforms.   
One area where we already see such an opposition is with regard to China’s long-standing 
tradition of mediation to resolve disputes, especially in rural areas of the country.
19
  The 
mediation tradition may be linked to the Confucian respect for elders as decision-makers and the 
Daoist value of harmonious dispute resolution as a preferred alternative to the coercive apparatus 
of the state.  While some, often western-educated, Chinese legal reformers argue that China 
should do away with mediation as part of a modernist break with the past, others point to 
mediation as a way to help ameliorate and deal with the widespread social disharmony brewing 
in the wake of China’s rapid industrialization.   
After all, unlike in the United States, the majority of Chinese people cannot afford a 
lawyer even in cases of dire need, and some of the problems of contemporary Chinese society 
are on a scale and of a nature with which the U.S. and Europe have never dealt.  Such problems 
include extreme overpopulation in some urban areas, stresses on the family social unit through 
displacement of people (largely driven by rapid urbanization under the four modernizations of 
the late 1970s and building on the decentralized industrialization of the Great Leap Forward and 
after-effects of the Cultural Revolution), and the “4-2-1” family pattern resulting from the 
Chinese state’s one-child policy, which has put enormous burdens on China’s youngest 
generation.  A move away from mediation and toward more litigation (driven by adversarial 
legalism) may result in a further weakening of the family and clan.  Such weakening of basic 
social structures could happen if, for instance, there is an end to the historic relationship in rural 
areas whereby local government administrators refer disputes to the clan to be settled privately, 
rather than having a public trial.  With respect to the mediation question, then, it is possible that 
modeling China’s local dispute resolution on the model of the American system may incur 
unnecessarily dire societal costs for twenty-first century China without a greater benefit. 
On the other hand, one could argue that an adversarial legal culture would immensely 
help China to deal with the disharmonies engendered by rapid growth.  It would do so by 
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19
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providing a voice to the disempowered through lawyers and the courts,
20
 as is a key aspect of the 
legal system in the United States.  For such a benefit to take root in China, however, there would 
need to be more reform than simply increasing the number of lawyers.  That step has already 
occurred and continues: there has been a twenty-fold increase in the number of lawyers in China 
in the last two decades.
21
  But as Kagan reminds us, setting up certain legal structures will “not 
completely determine how often conflicting parties actually use those institutions.”
22
  The vast 
majority of Chinese lawyers live in the cities and do not choose to become social justice 
advocates, pro bono or otherwise.  For an adversarial culture to serve the same purpose in China 
as it does in the United States with regard to helping particular groups such as juvenile 
delinquents or the mentally ill, a multitude of special “cause lawyers”
23
 would have to live not in 
the cities but in the countryside, where the majority of Chinese live.
24
  Currently, parties in 
dispute simply do not have the wherewithal in terms of money or modes of transport to get to the 
city to see a lawyer.  In addition, the continued interference of the local PSB and government in 
the legal system in terms of social justice cases also has dissuaded many lawyers from assuming 
more activist roles.  In other words, the courts may not be the avenue for cultivating a sense of 
social justice in China.  A connection, then, between rural China and a rural adversarial legal 
system akin to that in rural parts of Western countries is both tenuous and idealistic.   
Furthermore, it is far from clear what would be the Chinese court system’s tolerance of 
such lawyers becoming a common breed.  As Kagan points out, the United States legal system 
does not have the kind of judge-dominated litigation that many other countries have.
25
  China is 
closer in this regard to the European model, where judges ask the questions of witnesses and do 
most of the legal research and investigation themselves.  In this way, China stands in stark 
contrast to the United States, where these tasks are performed by attorney-advocates.  The 
Chinese system places relatively great confidence and trust in judges.  Historically, Chinese 
judges were trained in the classics of Chinese literature (including Confucian texts, Daoist texts 
and the others mentioned above).  They were expected to apply these ideas to cases of their day 
without undergoing much, if any, legal training per se.  Grasping the original principles, the 
resolution of legal disputes and the formulation of specific laws was largely to proceed by 
deduction.  Many and probably most Chinese judges today are not as well educated in “law” per 
se as western systems usually demand as a basis for judicial practice and effectively running an 
adversarial courtroom.  In fact, thanks to China’s “cultural revolution” and the fact that most 
judges are selected based on their position in the Chinese Communist Party, one of the greatest 
challenges China would face in establishing a functioning legal system on an adversarial model 
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is a lack of educated legal judges to make sense of a complex and growing body of case law and 
to treat parties on all sides fairly.  A system that would require such behavior of judges would be 
a novel introduction into the legal system and one which would most likely be resisted by local 
government.  Today, of course, Chinese judges do not explicitly apply Confucian, Daoist, or 
other ancient texts in order to decide cases, as they once did, nor do they study such texts as the 
explicit basis of their practice of law, but rather, more modern texts.  Nonetheless, with much 
less formal legal training than the training that most judges in the United States receive, and 
where the law inevitably has gaps, conflicts or ambiguities, the process of resolving cases is no 
doubt influenced by those “common sense”, basic social conceptions that, in judges’ minds, 
underlie the law.  Wide leeway for subjectivity in interpretation follows.  This leeway is a 
prerogative that Chinese judges are long-used to having.  Shifting the legal process of handling 
cases to a system of lawyers arguing over not only the underlying concepts of what is fair and 
just, but also how these concepts should apply to such basic, unresolved and explosive modern 
issues such as the propriety of the death penalty, re-education through labor, and revisions to the 
criminal procedure law,
26
 would be a drastic change that may run into firm resistance from the 
class of judges who are still very much in control of the system. 
 However, to the extent that such judges are not in complete control of Chinese legal 
reform, in addition to the problem of the judiciary itself, another source of resistance is the 
Communist Party, which controls all major legislative bodies in China.  Whereas Kagan presents 
the concept of adversarial legalism with “economically advanced democracies” in mind, China 
does not fit such a model.  Despite its rapid change, China is still a Communist country where 
the economy is arguably not “advanced” -- although this has become the subject of recurring 
debate within the World Trade Organization and other international bodies.  Its path of 
advancement may not, and probably will not, follow the path of western economies of the past, 
much less the United States specifically.  For example, is it possible to have a participatory 
democracy, a court system to uphold it, and a citizenry educated and sophisticated enough to 
keep democracy functioning, without the basic capitalist notion of private property rights?  
Neither the Chinese Communist Party, the National People’s Congress (NPC), nor the latter’s 
Standing Committee have clearly supported the idea of personal property rights.  The notion of 
private property rights is objectionable under the Marxist and Leninist ideologies upon which 
China’s current regime is based.  Although China now has billionaires and the legislature is now 
considering passage of a property law,
27
 the government still appears entrenched in the 
communist rhetoric that refuses to recognize or embody the right of all its citizens to private 
property.  This is a difficult but central issue that has sparked great controversy.  One of the 
meanings of modeling a twenty-first century Chinese legal system at least in part after the 
American one is that China must answer this question for itself. 
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Furthermore, Chinese reformers need to ask themselves whether it makes sense to strive 
for the adversarial legalism of a “strong society, weak state” democracy that Kagan says 
characterizes the United States in contrast to other western powers.
28
  That is the type of 
democracy in which adversarial legality has grown in the past.  But modern China is perhaps 
best described as the very opposite: weak society and strong state.  In order to strengthen its civil 
society, China would have to move quickly -- perhaps more quickly than is possible for such a 
huge population -- toward convincing and empowering its citizens to believe that the state will 
tolerate the challenging of the existing legal norms despite the brutal suppression of dissidents 
over the last few decades.  After the violent crackdown by the government on peaceful protestors 
at Tiananmen Square and hundreds of less popularly known incidents of violent government 
discouragement of dissidence in the years since, it is unclear how quickly such a change in 
policy could happen, even in China’s urban areas. 
As for tolerance of diverse political opinion in China’s countryside, an unlikely but fitting 
American image that may well represent the mentality in would-be reformers’ minds is “Save 
Freedom of Speech: Buy War Bonds,” one of Norman Rockwell’s classic “Four Freedoms” 
paintings.  In Rockwell’s painting, an average-looking man has just stood up to speak at a town 
meeting with his neighbors eagerly looking on.  While Rockwell’s famous image speaks of 
democracy for and empowerment of the common person and the wisdom of the uneducated 
laborer, the question that arises is whether that image could translate easily to a Chinese peasant 
farmer.  In China, reforms tolerating difference of opinion and advocating one’s cause, while 
they have potential to succeed,
29
 might just as well generate (1) a failure by rural farmers to 
embrace the call to speak up about civil and political rights because they simply do not care 
about such rights so much as they care about freedom from detention; or (2) a turn toward the 
violent abuse of this newfound freedom by rural farmers, resulting in the overthrow of what 
would be more vulnerable (“responsive”) local government institutions.   
After all, it is not long ago that Mao Zedong perceived such a stirring in the countryside 
and seized upon the potential for it to become a revolution.  If these are the sorts of 
considerations and realistic risks facing western-influenced and western-educated educated 
Chinese lawyers, officials and scholars who seek to transform their society through legal reform, 
then one should question whether Chinese elites might do better to suspend any speculation 
about how the American legal context may be comparable to China’s while they figure out what 
to do about the unprecedented disparities of wealth
30
 and other social crises facing their society.  
From this perspective, “transplanting” any western law, including adversarial legalism, makes 
little sense in a China as vast and as different from the West as China is today.   
Yet at the same time, it would seem that an inevitable implication of so many Chinese 
lawyers studying in the United States is that they are hoping to adopt an American legal model.   
One might argue, based on Kagan’s arguments, that the appropriate analogy is not 
“transplanting,” but rather, therapy.
31
  That is to say, a process of meaningful, incremental 
changes to the Chinese system that is not planned out entirely in advance, but rather, adapts 
organically to the circumstances that arise over time, may well benefit from adversarial legalist 
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inputs.  However, whether or not it is called transplanting, before any such change can succeed, a 
move toward seriously emulating American legal institutions would require reforming the 
governmental policymaking elite.  To appreciate the complexity of such a change, we should 
consider the nature of this elite. 
The Chinese intelligentsia is one that wrestles, often behind closed doors, with its own 
collective consciousness and notions of national identity.  There are significant underlying 
historical implications of the application of the external model of the United States to the case of 
China.  The United States especially and, in fact, most all western countries are perceived by 
many in the Chinese policymaking elite as former and perhaps continuing meddlers in Chinese 
affairs.  This perception goes back to at least the Opium Wars in the Chinese political 
consciousness.  The United States is currently the globally dominant military superpower.  
Among other things, the United States inherited much of its adversarial legal model from Great 
Britain, a former empire that competed in some respects with China itself, and the United States 
is still closely allied with Great Britain in a number of interventionist foreign policies around the 
globe.  The uniqueness and the legal exceptionalism of the American legal model grew up over 
centuries in the peculiar historical circumstances of a new nation developing on an unknown 
frontier (the “Wild West”), fighting for its independence and eventually becoming the world’s 
only superpower.  Among the results of America’s history on its legal and popular culture have 
been a distrust of government, a strong distaste for raising taxes even to support the most basic of 
programs,
32
 a tolerance for diversity (being a nation of immigrants, former slaves and colonized 
peoples), and a popularly-based state vilification of communism, which is often publicly equated 
with totalitarianism.  All of the above, notably, stand in stark contrast to the social narratives 
available in modern China.   
The idea of China looking to imitate American law or institutions, therefore, has cultural 
undertones that may result, paradoxically, in serious disengagement in the near future, as 
Chinese leaders seek to rally political support by resisting the path seen as alien, western, and in 
some sense, resented.  What the effect of that disengagement by the government would have is 
difficult to predict.  Concretely, we can expect a buildup of an adversarial legal culture in China 
to conflict directly against the interests of the contemporary Communist Party.  One way that 
such conflict would manifest itself is by challenging the Party’s use of law as a means to 
implement political, social or economic policies on such controversial matters as, for example, 
Hong Kong or Tibet. On issues like these, the Party’s interests are opposed to seeing the 
cultivation of law as transparent, democratic, and as an end in itself.  Such a legal culture would 
be a huge break with the past, especially the most recent decades, and would reduce the ability of 
the Party to control and predict the impact of litigated policy on the population. 
Secondly, we can expect some tension to arise over the issue of how independent China’s 
judiciary should be and what that independence really means in a Communist state.  Why would 
the National People’s Congress give up its effective final authority over important or key cases?  
Why would the courts be allowed to interpret the Constitution?  Even if these things come to 
pass as the issues are hotly debated, having a more American-style judiciary would inevitably 
mean less political concentration and monopoly of power by certain parties political 
fragmentation and less coordination between agencies of the government.
33
  In turn, such a 
weakened concentration would mean fragmentation of the government as the courts look less to 
the National People’s Congress for advisory opinions as they develop their own independent 
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culture, jurisprudential norms, and policies.  All of the above would entail a break from past 
practice in ways that would make the Communist Party more vulnerable.  Popular reforms that 
could be expected to follow might include, for example: allowing foreigners more access to 
many sorts of documents that are currently classified as state secrets; an end to dictating the 
future of the people of Hong Kong and Tibet; and an end to crushing domestic political 
movements or actions or dismissing mass justice claims en masse.  The net result of such 
changes for the legal system would be a reduction in the currently excessive bureaucratic 
administration of China’s government as more citizens are allowed to sue the government and 
thereby keep the people behind bureaucracies accountable.  While not guaranteed, one might 
also predict the emergence of a stronger system for judicial review, more like the one enjoyed in 
the United States.
34
  As the Chinese people become more empowered to use the legal system as a 
check on both corrupt local administrations and national and regional disregard of popular 
sentiment, this will lead to great demand for judicial review of cases decided unfairly or 
inconsistently with similar, past cases.  
While such changes might be praised by most anyone, they are also radical changes for 
China.  Certain factors pose barriers to such changes being successful.  In order for judges in 
China to accomplish the sort of ombuds-role over the National People’s Congress that judicial 
review entails, China would need to foster the sort of creativity in judges that we protect in the 
United States through granting them almost absolute immunity for their decisions.  Such 
immunity is far from reliable in today’s PRC.  Yet we have already seen the beginning of such 
review in China, with such “Marbury moments”
 35
 as the 1999 “Right of Abode” cases,
36
 where 
Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeals held firm on a decision based on judicial prerogative to 
deviate from 140 years of common law.  Although the Right of Abode case is still subject to 
“interpretation” by the NPC, it represents what might be an early defining move toward judicial 
review.  But in order for judges in China to accomplish the meaningful check over the actions of 
Congress which would characterize a functioning adversarial-legalist system, Chinese courts 
would need to press far beyond the Right of Abode cases, and grant judges the protection 
required for their decisions to be truly independent.
37
  The problem is that doing this successfully 
means securing the cooperation of the NPC – a task easier said than done. 
If successful, then, one would expect an expansion of judicial review in China to result in 
a reduction of seemingly arbitrary decision-making authority by the NPC.  Such discretion, 
historically, has been vested in the NPC by laws that in the modern United States would likely be 
held either unconstitutional or voided for vagueness.  Perhaps the most obvious example of such 
laws and the power to abuse them in China would be the discretion to divide the people into 
artificial classes such as “the people” and “the enemy,” which was used so capriciously by 
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Chairman Mao.  Adversarial legalism in China could mean the curtailment of such government 
abuses
38
 if the courts are vested with an ability to check the Congress by being as independent as 
they are in western, especially American, government. 
Along these lines, and perhaps to some extent already, reforms toward adversarial 
legalism might mean an enhancement of the political legitimacy of China’s entire system of 
government, just as adversarial legalism serves that end in the United States.
39
  In a sense, we 
can expect this result in any case vis-à-vis China’s reputation on the world stage, whether or not 
China’s efforts at cultivating a more western-style legal system are sincere.  Whether or not 
corruption and arbitrary rulings are truly reduced in China by means of adversarial legalism, by 
paying lip service to Western adversarial legalism (in terms of visible efforts to at least “talk the 
talk” about “rule of law”), China historically has been able to reap various benefits such as most-
favored nation status with the United States and the general attraction of outside investment 
under the “four modernizations” of the 1970s.  It is during this time that China instituted 
western-style intellectual property laws, but the enforcement of such laws has been notoriously 
lacking, even under such basic documents as the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
40
   
This phenomenon of Chinese purported importation of foreign law, coupled with a lack 
of actual application, has occurred with imported aspects of western criminal law and procedure.  
Chinese innocents are regularly wrongfully detained with no compensation or review, and sent to 
between one and four years of “re-education through labor” by administrative decision, without 
being convicted of any crime.  The fact that China’s adopted criminal law and procedure in 
practice deviates widely from the sort of adversarial, individualistic and legalistic model that 
Kagan describes in America is further demonstrated by the fact that Chinese police officers and 
the public security bureau can arbitrarily, without established criteria, send people to prison labor 
for drug offenses and yet some offenders can escape detention is they have wealth or 
connections.
41
 
On the other hand, one must weigh this dynamic of “talking the talk but not walking the 
walk” against the resentment factor mentioned above: an underlying historical current of 
antagonism occasioned by western state-sanctioned pressures on Chinese domestic affairs. Such 
western interventions stem back at least to the Opium Wars and the Treaty of Nanjing (seen by 
many Chinese as void ab inicio) which resulted in British rule over Hong Kong until very 
recently.  Emulating an American or western model of legal institutions, then, means surrender 
or giving in to the West’s general challenge to the Chinese people’s longstanding, deep-going 
view of themselves as at the top of a world order or at the center of world progress (“the Middle 
Kingdom,”) rather than following someone else’s lead (the West).   
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Even if an increasing number of Chinese legal scholars are educated in the United States, 
this current of thought will eventually manifest itself again.  Prior instances of resistance against 
western-initiated and western-led legal movements are not too long ago.  It was only 50 years 
ago that China refused to play a role in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
other post-WWII multilateral institutions because it did not see itself as having to, nor wanting 
to, negotiate with the “rich man’s club.”  Before that, it was partially because Karl Marx and 
Vladimir Lenin were on the margins of, and largely rejected by, prominent European 
intelligentsia at the time, that their ideas appealed to Chinese leaders in the first place.  Had 
communist ideas been more accepted or legitimate among the western intelligentsia at the time, 
China would likely be a very different place today, for such ideas would likely have been 
dismissed as western before they could be implemented on a large scale in China.  Adopting an 
adversarial legal approach means that the Chinese must quite consciously face the pervasive 
view among the Chinese people regarding the United States, and the West more generally, as a 
historical menace, an imperial power at odds with China as the Middle Kingdom.  Of course, 
there are many Chinese reformers who are also looking to the traditional Chinese practice of 
studying many foreign systems and then selecting what they see as appropriate to the Chinese 
context.  It is not just a choice between the Middle Kingdom way or the western way.  The idea 
of therapy, as opposed to a transplant of law, could play an important role in the way Chinese 
leaders navigate legal reforms going forward.  In any case, such reforms will no doubt require 
continually revising and revisiting the historical relationship between the government’s “rule of 
law”, “rule by law” and the more general role of law in Chinese society, as well as the narratives 
used to describe and delimit the relationship between these ideas.   
Surely the narratives that are used and exchanged in order to navigate that relationship 
present unique dilemmas in a twenty-first century China becoming more open to foreign ideas 
while keeping a strong connection to its ancient and profound social paradigms.  Even more 
surely, whatever adversarial legalism is adopted in China’s emerging new legal system will have 
to be carefully applied in the context of a unique path of legal, cultural and economic 
development far different from any path trodden by the nations before it.  Such a path, with all 
the contradictions and juxtapositions of past and present that it will involve, may one day create 
a new status quo and in fact revolutionize legal thinking well beyond China’s borders, 
challenging today’s generalizations about legal adversarialism and law in general as it has 
evolved in the West. 
